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Abstract
Quitting games are one of the simplest stochastic games in which at any stage each
player has only two possible actions, continue and quit. The game ends as soon as at least
one player chooses to quit. The players then receive a payoff, which depends on the set of
players that did choose to quit. If the game never ends, the payoff to each player is zero.
Examples of quitting games were studied first by Flesh, Thuijsman and Vrieze in
1997 ([1]). Solan 1999 ([6]) proved that all three-player quitting games have approximate
equilibria. In the paper Quitting Games Solan and Vieille 2001 ([7]) proved the existence
of subgame-perfect approximate equilibria under some restrictions on the payoff function.
Furthermore Solan and Vieille studied in [8] a four-player quitting game example in which
the simplest equilibrium strategy is periodic with period two. In The structure of non-
zero-sum stochastic games ([5]) Simon showed under which properties quitting games
have approximate equilibria among other things by generalization of the solution-idea
from Solan an Vieille.
This paper gives a short introduction into the topic quitting games and tries to illus-
trate several properties with examples. First the mathematical model of a quitting game
is presented. After the definition of the strategy and strategy profile the corresponding
probability space and the underlying stochastic process are stated. This leads to the
expected payoff and the definition of some equilibria.
For a better analysis of quitting games the so called one-step game is introduced in
the second part of this paper. Important properties of strategy profiles in one-step games
are posted and proved.
In the third section an important theorem from Solan and Vieille (cf. [7]) is cited,
in which the existence of approximate equilibria, under some assumptions to the payoff
function, is postulated. It’s proof is divided into three parts, however this paper concen-
trates only on the first one. In the referred literature only a few steps of the proof are
denoted. It is the aim to show the proof at length under usage of the then known results.
1 The model
A quitting game is a sequential N -player (N ∈ N) game and played as follows. In every game
turn each player has only two possible actions continue and quit. The game ends as soon as at
least one of the N -players chooses to quit. We denote S (quitting coalition) as the subset of
∗This article appeared under the former family name Heimann in the conference proceedings of the ”Inter-
national Symposium on Dynamic Games and Applications”, Wro law 2008.
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the players who choose to quit. If S = ∅ the players receive no payoff and the game continues
to the next stage. If S 6= ∅ each player n ∈ {1, . . . , N} receives the payoff rnS ∈ R and the
game terminates.
Definition 1.1 (Quitting Game) A quitting game is a tuple
G = (N , (rS)∅⊆S⊆N ) (1)
where
– N = {1, . . . , N} ⊂ N is a finite set of players, N ∈ N,
– S ∈ P(N ) denotes the quitting coalition and
– (rS)S∈P(N ) ∈ R
N is a sequence of payoff-vectors to the players under the quitting coali-
tion S with r∅ = 0 (0 := (0, . . . , 0)
T ∈ RN) and rS = (r
1
S , . . . , r
N
S )
T .
Remark 1.2 A quitting game is a special case of a (stochastic) game, where transition prob-
abilities are even deterministic. For comparison (cf. e.g. [4]):
– The state space is given by Z := {S | ∅ ⊆ S ⊆ N} = P(N ).
– The action space is given by A := {0, 1}N , where 0 stands for continue and 1 for quit.
We denote aS = (a
1
S , . . . , a
N
S )
T as element of A with
anS :=
{
0 for n ∈ N \ S
1 for n ∈ S
∀n ∈ N , ∅ ⊆ S ⊆ N . (2)
– The transition law t : Z ×A× Z → [0, 1] is given by
t(z|∅, aS) :=
{
1 for z = S
0 otherwise
t(z|S˜, aS) :=
{
1 for z = S˜
0 otherwise
(3)
where z, S, S˜ ∈ Z, S˜ 6= ∅ and aS ∈ A.
– The payoff function is given by r˜ : A→ RN , aS 7→ r˜(aS) := rS.
– There is no discounting in this model.
Example 1: A typical way to describe two- or three-player quitting games is in a matrix.
For example let two players be given. Player one is the so called row player and player two
the column player.
Player 2
continue quit
Player 1
continue
quit
	
( 1 ,−1 )
( 1 , 1 )
(−2 ,−2 )
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Where 	 means, that the players does not receive any payoff and the game continues to the
next round.
In this case the quitting game is given by
G =
(
{1, 2},
(
r∅ =
(
0
0
)
, r{1} =
(
1
−1
)
, r{2} =
(
1
1
)
, rN =
(
−2
−2
)))
.
For further analysis the term “strategy profile” is needed.
Definition 1.3 (strategy profile, strategy) Let G = (N , (rS)∅⊆S⊆N ) be a given quitting
game. A sequence of probability vectors π := (pi)i∈N with pi = (p
1
i , . . . , p
N
i )
T ∈ [0, 1]N is called
strategy profile in the quitting game G for the players 1, . . . , N . pni stands for the probability
that player n will play the action quit at stage i. The sequence πn := (pni )i∈N is called strategy
for player n, n ∈ N .
Let Π be the set of all strategy profiles for the given quitting game.
Definition 1.4 (subgame profile) Let G = (N , (rS)∅⊆S⊆N ) be a given quitting game and
π = (pi)i∈N a strategy profile in G. For each j ∈ N, πj := (pi)j≤i∈N denotes the subgame
profile induced by π in the quitting game starting at time j.
Definition 1.5 (pure, cyclic, stationary) Let π = (pi)i∈N be a strategy profile in a quit-
ting game G. A strategy πn = (pni )i∈N for player n is called
– pure, if pni ∈ {0, 1} for all i ∈ N.
– cyclic, if a k0 ∈ N exists such that p
n
k = p
n
k+k0
for every k ∈ N.
– stationary, if pnk = p
n
1 for all k ∈ N.
A strategy profile π is called pure, if all strategies πn, n ∈ N , are pure. It is cyclic, if all
strategies are cyclic, and stationary, if all strategies are stationary.
Notation 1.6 Let π = (pi)i∈N be a strategy profile and π˜
n = (p˜ni )i∈N an alternative strategy
for player n, n ∈ N . We denote by π−n the strategy profile for the players j ∈ N \{n} and by
(π−n, π˜n) an alternative strategy profile for player n in which the players j ∈ N \ {n} carry
on playing π−n, that means
π−n :=


p11 p
1
2 . . .
...
...
pn−11 p
n−1
2 . . .
pn+11 p
n+1
2 . . .
...
...
pN1 p
N
2 . . .


and (π−n, π˜n) :=


p11 p
1
2 . . .
...
...
pn−11 p
n−1
2 . . .
p˜n1 p˜
n
2 . . .
pn+11 p
n+1
2 . . .
...
...
pN1 p
N
2 . . .


.
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1.1 The underlying stochastic process
Let G = (N , (rS)∅⊆S⊆N ) be the given quitting game, Z = {S | ∅ ⊆ S ⊆ N} the corresponding
state space and A = {0, 1}N the corresponding action space (cf. remark 1.2). Set
Ω := (Z ×A)∞
and
A := P(Z) ⊗P(A) ⊗ P(Z)⊗ P(A) ⊗ . . . .
Furthermore and without loss of generality let z = ∅ be the initial state. If a strategy profile
π = (pi)i∈N ∈ Π is given, a unique probability measure Ppi on (Ω,A) and a stochastic process
(Xk, Yk)k∈N with values in (Z ×A) exist, where
– Xk(ω) = Xk
(
(z1, a1, z2, a2, . . .)
)
:= zk
(Xk denotes the random state of the system at time k, k ∈ N, ω ∈ Ω),
– Yk(ω) = Yk
(
(z1, a1, z2, a2, . . .)
)
:= ak
(Yk denotes the random action taken at time k, k ∈ N, ω ∈ Ω),
– Hk := (X1, Y1, . . . ,Xk),
that means Hk(ω) = Hk
(
(z1, a1, z2, a2, . . .)
)
= (z1, a1, z2, a2, . . . , zk)
(Hk describes the random history at time k, k ∈ N, ω ∈ Ω)
hold and Ppi is defined by
– Ppi(X1 = ∅) := 1,
– Ppi(Xk+1 = z|Hk = (z1, a1, . . . , zk), Yk = a) := t(z|zk, a)
if Ppi(Hk = (z1, a1, . . . , zk), Yk = a) > 0 and
– Ppi(Yk = a|Hk = (z1, a1, . . . , zk)) :=
∏
{n∈N :an=1}
pnk
∏
{m∈N :am=0}
(1− pmk )
if Ppi(Hk = (z1, a1, . . . , zk)) > 0
with z, zi ∈ Z for all i = 1 . . . , k and a, ai ∈ A for all i = 1, . . . , k − 1.
Equivalently, Ppi can also be described as the unique probability measure on (Ω,A) for which
– Ppi(X1 = ∅) := 1 and
– Ppi(Hk = (z1, a1, z2, a2, . . . , zk))
:= Ppi(X1 = z1)
k−1∏
i=1
t(zi+1|zi, ai) ·
( ∏
{n∈N :an
i
=1}
pni
∏
{m∈N :am
i
=0}
(1− pmi )
)
,
where zi ∈ Z for all i = 1, . . . , k and ai ∈ A for all i = 1, . . . , k − 1.
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1.2 Expected payoffs and equilibria
In this section the expected payoff for a given quitting game will be defined and additionally
the terms Nash-equilibria, ε-equilibria and approximate equilibria.
In [7] the expected payoff for a quitting game G = (N , (rS)∅⊆S⊆N ) and the strategy profile
π ∈ Π is defined with a stopping time τ : Ω→ N ∪ {+∞} where
τ(ω) := inf
{
k ∈ N : Yk(ω) ∈ A \ {(0, . . . , 0)
T }
}
concerning the filtration (Ak)k∈N with Ak := σ{Yi : 1 ≤ i ≤ k}.
Definition 1.7 (Expected payoff) Let G = (N , (rS)∅⊆S⊆N ) be a quitting game and π ∈ Π
the chosen strategy profile. The expected payoff of the game is given by
γ(π) := Epi(r˜(Yτ )1{τ<∞})
with r˜ from remark 1.2, γ(π) = (γ1(π), . . . , γN (π))T and Epi as expected value with respect to
the probability measure Ppi.
With use of the definition of Ppi and r˜(0) = r∅ = 0 one obtains
γ(π) = Epi(r˜(Yτ )1τ<∞)
=
∑
k∈N
∑
ak∈A
Ppi(τ = k, Yk = ak) · r˜(ak)
=
∑
k∈N
( ∑
ak∈A
Ppi
(
Hk−1 = (∅, 0, ∅, 0, . . . , ∅), Yk = ak
)
· r˜(ak)
)
=
∑
k∈N
( k−1∏
i=1
∏
n∈N
(1− pni ) ·
∑
ak∈A
r˜(ak) ·
∏
{n∈N :an
k
=1}
pnk
∏
{m∈N :am
k
=0}
(1− pmk )
)
and with remark 1.2 follows
γ(π) =
∑
k∈N
( k−1∏
i=1
∏
n∈N
(1− pni ) ·
∑
S∈P(N )
rS ·
∏
n∈S
pnk
∏
m∈N\S
(1− pmk )
)
.
Definition 1.8 (ε-equilibrium, Nash-equilibrium, approximate equilibria) Let G =
(N , (rS)∅⊆S⊆N ) be a quitting game. A strategy profile π = (pi)i∈N is called ε-equilibrium
(ε ≥ 0) if for every player n ∈ N and every strategy π˜n of player n
γn(π) ≥ γn((π−n, π˜n))− ε (4)
holds.
The strategy profile π = (pi)i∈N is called Nash-equilibrium or (0−)equilibrium if π is an
ε-equilibrium for ε = 0.
A game has got approximate equilibria, if for all ε > 0 an ε-equilibrium exists.
Definition 1.9 (subgame ε-equilibrium) Let G = (N , (rS)∅⊆S⊆N ) be a quitting game. A
strategy profile π = (pi)i∈N is called subgame ε-equilibrium (ε ≥ 0) if for all j ∈ N the subgame
profile πj is also an ε-equilibrium in G.
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2 One-step game
The consideration of so called one-step games is an instrument for analyzing quitting games.
These games are also known as one-stage games ([5], p. 15) or as one-shot game ([7], p. 269).
Definition 2.1 (One-step game) Let G = (N , (rS)∅⊆S⊆N ) be a given quitting game. For
every v ∈ RN the tuple
Γv := (G, v) =
(
(N , (rS)∅⊆S⊆N
)
, v)
denotes the one-step game corresponding to the quitting game G, where the players receive
the payoff v if S = ∅ and rS otherwise (∅ 6= S ⊆ N ).
A one-step game has only one stage. The transition law, the state and action space are the
same as the transition law, the state and action space of the quitting game (cf. remark 1.2).
For the payoff function r˜v : A→ R
N
a 7→ r˜v(a) :=
{
v if a = 0
r{n∈N|an=1} otherwise.
Definition 2.2 (Strategy profile, strategy in the one-step game) Let Γv = (G, v) be
a given one-step game. A vector p = (p1, . . . , pN )T ∈ [0, 1]N is called strategy profile for the
one-step game Γv, where p
n stands for the probability that player n will play the action quit.
pn denotes the strategy for player n, n ∈ N , in the one-step game Γv.
Notation 2.3 Let p ∈ [0, 1]N be a strategy profile for a one-step game Γv and p˜
n a strategy for
player n. Similar to notation 1.6, p−n denotes the strategy profile for the players j ∈ N \{n}
and (p−n, p˜n) an alternative strategy profile for player n in which the players j ∈ N \ {n}
carry on playing p−n, that means
p−n :=


p1
...
pn−1
pn+1
...
pN


and (p−n, p˜ n) :=


p1
...
pn−1
p˜ n
pn+1
...
pN


.
Let Γv = (G, v) and p ∈ [0, 1]
N be given. Without loss of generality the game starts in
the state z = ∅. The corresponding probability space (Ω¯, A¯,Pp) and the stochastic process
(X¯1, Y¯1, X¯2) are defined by
– Ω¯ := Z ×A× Z,
– A¯ := P(Z) ⊗P(A) ⊗ P(Z),
– X¯i(ω) = X¯i((z1, a, z2)) := zi, i = 1, 2,
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– Y¯1(ω) = Y¯1((z1, a, z2)) := a,
– Pp(X¯1 = ∅) := 1,
Pp({ω}) = Pp((z1, a, z2))
:= Pp(X¯1 = z1) · t(z2|z1, a)
∏
{n∈N :an=1}
pn
∏
{m∈N :am=0}
(1− pm),
with ω ∈ Ω¯, z1, z2 ∈ Z, a ∈ A.
The expected payoff γv for the one-step game Γv under the strategy profile p ∈ [0, 1]
N is given
by
γv(p) := Ep
(
r˜v(Y1)
)
=
∑
aS∈A
Pp(Y1 = aS) · r˜v(aS)
= Pp(Y1 = a∅) · v +
∑
S∈P(N )
Pp(Y1 = aS) · rS
where γv(p) = (γ
1
v (p), . . . , γ
N
v (p))
T andEp is the expected value with respect to the probability
measure Pp. γ
n
v (p) is the expected payoff for player n (n ∈ N ) in the one-step game Γv under
the strategy profile p.
Notation 2.4 The function ̺ : [0, 1]N × P(N )→ [0, 1],
(p, S) 7→ ̺(p, S) :=
∏
n∈S
p n
∏
m∈N\S
(1− pm),
with p = (p 1, . . . , pN )T , denotes the probability that a quitting coalition S or – equivalent to
that – an action aS ∈ A is chosen under the vector p.
With this notation for the expected payoff γv under the strategy profile p ∈ [0, 1]
N follows
γv(p) = ̺(p, ∅) · v +
∑
S∈P(N )
̺(p, S) · rS .
Proposition 2.5 Let Γv be a given one-step game and p ∈ [0, 1]
N a strategy profile in Γv.
Then for the expected payoff γv(p)
γnv (p) ∈ [−δv, δv ]
holds for all n ∈ N , where
δv := max
{
max
n∈N
|vn|, max
{
|rnS |
∣∣ S ∈ P(N )}}. (5)
Proof: For all p ∈ [0, 1]N and all n ∈ N
γnv (p) = ̺(p, ∅) · v
n +
∑
S∈P(N )\{∅}
̺(p, S) · rnS
≤ ̺(p, ∅) · |vn|+
∑
S∈P(N )\{∅}
̺(p, S) · |rnS |
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holds. With δv like in (5)
γnv (p) ≤ ̺(p, ∅) · δv +
∑
S∈P(N )\{∅}
̺(p, S) · δv
= δv ·
(
̺(p, ∅) +
∑
S∈P(N )\{∅}
̺(p, S)
)
follows on the one hand and on the other
γnv (p) ≥ −̺(p, ∅) · |v
n| −
∑
S∈P(N )\{∅}
̺(p, S) · |rnS |
≥ −δv ·
(
̺(p, ∅) +
∑
S∈P(N )\{∅}
̺(p, S)
)
.
With
̺(p, ∅) +
∑
S∈P(N )\{∅}
̺(p, S) = 1,
γnv (p) ∈ [−δv, δv ] holds for all p ∈ [0, 1]
N and n ∈ N .

In order to show that the expected payoff γv(p) is linear in the strategy p
n of player n for all
n ∈ N the following proposition is needed.
Proposition 2.6 For all p ∈ [0, 1]N , all S ∈ P(N ) and all i ∈ N
̺(p, S) = pi · ̺
(
(p−i, 1), S
)
+ (1− pi) · ̺
(
(p−i, 0), S
)
holds.
Proof:
Case 1: i ∈ S
Because
̺(p, S) =
∏
n∈S
pn
∏
n∈N\S
(1− pn) = pi ·
∏
n∈S\{i}
pn
∏
n∈N\S
(1− pn),
with (p−i, 1)i = 1 and pn = (p−i, 1)n for all n ∈ N \ {i}, where (p−i, 1)n denotes the n-th
component of the alternative strategy profile for player i,
̺(p, S) = pi · (p−i, 1)i ·
∏
n∈S\{i}
(p−i, 1)n
∏
n∈N\S
(
1− (p−i, 1)n
)
= pi ·
∏
n∈S
(p−i, 1)n
∏
n∈N\S
(
1− (p−i, 1)n
)
= pi · ̺
(
(p−i, 1), S
)
follows.
Case 2: i ∈ N \ S
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Because
̺(p, S) = (1− pi) ·
∏
n∈S
pn
∏
n∈N\(S∪{i})
(1− pn),
with (p−i, 0)i = 0 and pn = (p−i, 0)n for all n ∈ N \ {i}
̺(p, S) = (1− pi) ·
(
1− (p−i, 0)i
)
·
∏
n∈S
(p−i, 0)n
∏
n∈N\(S∪{i})
(
1− (p−i, 0)n
)
= (1− pi) ·
∏
n∈S
(p−i, 0)n
∏
n∈N\S
(
1− (p−i, 0)n
)
= (1− pi) · ̺
(
(p−i, 0), S
)
follows.
Because of ̺
(
(p−i, 1), S
)
= 0 for i ∈ N \ S and ̺
(
(p−i, 0), S
)
= 0 for i ∈ S, case 1 and case 2
imply the proposition.

Proposition 2.7 Let Γv be a given one-step game. Then for all p ∈ [0, 1]
N and all n ∈ N
γv(p) = γv((p
−n, 0)) + pn ·
(
γv((p
−n, 1)) − γv((p
−n, 0))
)
holds, that means the expected payoff γv(p) is linear in the strategy p
n of player n for all
p ∈ [0, 1]N and all n ∈ N .
Proof:
γv(p) = ̺(p, ∅) · v +
∑
S∈P(N )
̺(p, S) · rS
With proposition 2.6 and ̺
(
(p−n, 1), ∅
)
= 0 one obtains for all n ∈ N
γv(p) =
(
pn · ̺
(
(p−n, 1), ∅
)
+ (1− pn) · ̺
(
(p−n, 0), ∅
))
· v
+
∑
S∈P(N )
(
pn · ̺
(
(p−n, 1), S
)
+ (1− pn) · ̺
(
(p−n, 0), S
))
· rS
= (1− pn) · ̺
(
(p−n, 0), ∅
)
· v + (1− pn)
∑
S∈P(N )
̺
(
(p−n, 0), S
)
· rS
+ pn
∑
S∈P(N )
̺
(
(p−n, 1), S
)
· rS
Furthermore
γv((p
−n, 0)) = ̺
(
(p−n, 0), ∅
)
· v +
∑
S∈P(N )
̺((p−n, 0), S) · rS
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and
γv((p
−n, 1)) =
∑
S∈P(N )
̺((p−n, 1), S) · rS .
That implies
γv(p) = (1− p
n) · γv((p
−n, 0)) + pn · γv((p
−n, 1)).

Conclusion 2.8 Let p ∈ [0, 1]N be a strategy profile in the one-step game Γv. The following
equations hold:
1. γv((p
−n, 1)) = piγv
((
(p−n, 1)−i, 1
))
+ (1− pi)γv
((
(p−n, 1)−i, 0
))
2. γv((p
−n, 0)) = piγv
((
(p−n, 0)−i, 1
))
+ (1− pi)γv
((
(p−n, 0)−i, 0
))
for all i, n ∈ N , i 6= n.
Definition 2.9 (ε-equilibrium, Nash-equilibrium, approximate equilibria of the
one-step game) Let Γv be a one-step game corresponding to a quitting game G. The strategy
profile p ∈ [0, 1]N is called an ε-equilibrium for ε ≥ 0 if
∀n ∈ N ∀p˜n ∈ [0, 1] : γnv (p) ≥ γ
n
v
(
(p−n, p˜n)
)
− ε.
If p is an ε-equilibrium with ε = 0, p is also called (Nash-)equilibrium.
A one-step game Γv has got approximate equilibria, if for all ε > 0 an ε-equilibrium in Γv
exists.
Because of the linearity of the expected payoff γv(p) in the strategies p
n (n ∈ N ) it is sufficient
to consider the expected payoff only for pure strategies in order to find out whether a given
strategy profile in a one-step game is an equilibrium or not, since the extreme values of γv(p)
is for each single player attained in a border point. The following example illustrates this
fact.
Example 2: Consider example 1 again. The corresponding one-step game Γv for a vector
v = (v1, v2)T ∈ R2 is given by
Player 2
continue quit
Player 1
continue
quit
( v1 , v2)
( 1 ,−1 )
( 1 , 1 )
( −2 ,−2 )
Consider four different given v’s:
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1. v1 =
(
2
2
)
:
The strategy profile p =
(
0.1
0
)
is a 0.1-equilibrium with the expected payoff
γv1(p) = 0.9 ·
(
2
2
)
+ 0.1 ·
(
1
−1
)
=
(
1.9
1.7
)
.
Because if player 1 chooses to play continue while player 2 keeps on playing continue
he has got an expected payoff of γ1v1((0, 0)
T ) = 2, which is 0.1 better than his expected
payoff under p. If he plays quit his expected payoff would be γ1v1((1, 0)
T ) = 1.
Otherwise if player 2 chooses to play quit while player 1 keeps on playing quit with a
probability of 0.1, player 2 gains a payoff of
γ2v1((0.1, 1)
T ) = 0.9 · 1 + 0.1 · (−2) = 0.7.
Player 2 would even change for the worse.
2. v2 =
(
0
2
)
:
The strategy profile p =
(
1
0
)
is a Nash-equilibrium with the expected payoff γv2(p) =(
1
−1
)
. Because if player 1 chooses to play continue while player 2 keeps on playing
continue he has got an expected payoff of γ1v2((0, 0)
T ) = 0 and if player 2 chooses to play
quit while player 1 keeps on playing quit, player 2 gains a payoff of γ2v2((1, 1)
T ) = −2.
Player 2 would even change for the worse, too.
3. v3 =
(
2
0
)
:
Analogously to case 2, the strategy profile p =
(
0
1
)
is a Nash-equilibrium with the
expected payoff γv3(p) =
(
1
1
)
.
4. v4 =
(
0
0
)
:
The strategy profile p1 =
(
1
0
)
is a Nash-equilibrium with the expected payoff
γv4(p1) =
(
1
−1
)
. Analogously p2 =
(
0
1
)
is also a Nash-equilibrium with the
expected payoff γv4(p2) =
(
1
1
)
.
Obviously the choice of v is important. This leads to the question which v’s are expedient
referring to finding an (ε-)equilibrium in the corresponding quitting game1 . For example: It
1Simon therefore introduced in [5] the term feasible for a vector v ∈ RN : A vector v ∈ RN is feasible if it
is in the convex hull of {rS|∅ 6= S ⊂ N} ∪ {0}.
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does not make sense to choose v like in the first case, because in the corresponding quitting
game the expected payoffs are limited by one for each player.
Furthermore proposition 2.7 motivates the definition of the best reply, but before stating the
definition it is necessary to introduce the mapping supp. supp : [0, 1] → P({0, 1}) denotes
the actions that are played with positive probability under p˜, that means
supp(p˜) :=


{0} for p˜ = 0
{0, 1} for p˜ ∈ (0, 1)
{1} for p˜ = 1
.
Definition 2.10 (best reply, perfect) Let Γv be a given one-step game and p ∈ [0, 1]
N a
strategy profile in Γv. An action b ∈ {0, 1} of player n is an ε-best reply for p
−n if
γnv ((p
−n, b)) ≥ max
b˜∈{0,1}
γnv ((p
−n, b˜))− ε
n ∈ N .
A strategy profile p ∈ [0, 1]N in Γv is called ε-perfect
2, if for every player n ∈ N , every action
b ∈ supp(pn) is an ε-best reply for p−n.
Remark 2.11 Let Γv be the given one-step game and ε ≥ 0. The second part of the definition
above is equivalent to the following:
The strategy profile p for the one-step game Γv is ε-perfect, if
∀n ∈ N :


γnv ((p
−n, 1)) − γnv ((p
−n, 0)) ≤ ε for pn = 0
γnv ((p
−n, 1)) − γnv ((p
−n, 0)) ∈ [−ε, ε] for pn ∈ (0, 1)
γnv ((p
−n, 1)) − γnv ((p
−n, 0)) ≥ −ε for pn = 1
.
Now look at Example 1 again:
Example 3: Consider the one-step game Γv with v =
(
0
2
)
.
1. p =
(
1
0
)
:
p is a Nash-equilibrum in Γv, but is p also (0-)perfect?
It holds that
p1 = 1 : γ1v ((p
−1, 1))− γ1v ((p
−1, 0)) = 1− 0 = 1 ≥ 0
and
p2 = 0 : γ2v ((p
−2, 1))− γ2v ((p
−2, 0)) = −2− (−1) = −1 ≤ 0.
So with remark 2.11 p is perfect.
2Solan an Vieille used in [7] instead of the term “ε-perfect” the term “perfect ε-equilibrium”. This formu-
lation is confusing with regard to theorem 2.12. The here used phrase is more accurate.
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2. p =
(
1
0.1
)
:
p is a 0.1-equilibrium, because:
γv(p) = 0.1 ·
(
−2
−2
)
+ 0.9 ·
(
1
−1
)
=
(
0.7
−1.1
)
.
If player one chooses to play continue, while player two keeps on playing p2, he gains a
payoff of 0.1, which is less than before.
If player two chooses to play continue with certainty, while player one keeps on playing
quit, he anticipates a payoff of −1, which is 0.1 more than before.
But is p also 0.1-perfect?
The answer is no, because
p2 ∈ (0.1) : γ2v((p
−2, 1)) − γ2v((p
−2, 0)) = −2− (−1) = −1 /∈ [−0.1, 0.1].
Which relation exists between (ε-)equilibria strategy profiles and (ε-)perfect strategy profiles
(ε ≥ 0)?
Theorem 2.12 Let Γv be a given one-step game and ε ≥ 0. Then the following propositions
hold:
1. p ∈ [0, 1]N is ε-perfect for Γv =⇒ p is an ε-equilibrium in Γv;
2. p ∈ [0, 1]N is an ε-equilibrium in Γv =⇒ p is εξp-perfect for Γv,
where
ξp := max
n∈N
ξnp and ξ
n
p :=
{
max( 1
pn
, 11−pn ) for p
n ∈ (0, 1)
1 for pn ∈ {0, 1}
.
Proof:
1.: Let p ∈ [0, 1]N be ε-perfect for Γv. It is to show that p is also an ε-equilibrium in Γv, that
means
γnv (p) ≥ max
p˜∈[0,1]
γnv
(
(p−n, p˜)
)
− ε
for all n ∈ N .
Because of the linearity of γnv (p) with respect to p
n (cf. proposition 2.7) it is sufficient to
show that
γnv (p) ≥ max
p˜∈{0,1}
γnv
(
(p−n, p˜)
)
− ε (6)
for all n ∈ N .
Since p is ε-perfect in Γv, the inequality (6) follows immediately for p
n = 0 and pn = 1.
For pn ∈ (0, 1) it holds either
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(a) γnv
(
(p−n, 1)
)
≥ γnv (p) ≥ γ
n
v
(
(p−n, 0)
)
or
(b) γnv
(
(p−n, 0)
)
> γnv (p) > γ
n
v
(
(p−n, 1)
)
.
Case (a): With p ε-perfect in Γv and remark 2.11, it holds
γnv (p) ≥ γ
n
v
(
(p−n, 0)
)
≥ γnv
(
(p−n, 1)
)
− ε.
Because γnv
(
(p−n, 1)
)
= max
p˜∈[0,1]
γnv
(
(p−n, p˜)
)
γnv (p) ≥ max
p˜∈[0,1]
γnv
(
(p−n, p˜)
)
− ε
follows.
Case (b): Analogously to case (a) with p ε-perfect in Γv and remark 2.11
γnv (p) > γ
n
v
(
(p−n, 1)
)
≥ γnv
(
(p−n, 0)
)
− ε = max
p˜∈[0,1]
γnv
(
(p−n, p˜)
)
− ε
follows.
So for both cases (6) holds.
2.: Let p be an ε-equilibrium, that means for all n ∈ N and for all p˜ ∈ [0, 1]
γnv (p) ≥ γ
n
v
(
(p−n, p˜)
)
− ε (7)
holds. That implies
γnv (p) ≥ γ
n
v
(
(p−n, 1)
)
− ε (8)
for pn = 0 and
γnv (p) ≥ γ
n
v
(
(p−n, 0)
)
− ε (9)
for pn = 1.
Consider now pn ∈ (0, 1). For all p˜ ∈ [0, 1]
γnv (p) = p
n · γnv
(
(p−n, 1)
)
+ (1− pn) · γnv
(
(p−n, 0)
)
≥ γnv
(
(p−n, p˜)
)
− ε. (10)
holds (c.f. proposition 2.7).
For p˜ = 1, with (10)
(1− pn) · γnv
(
(p−n, 0)
)
− (1− pn) · γnv
(
(p−n, 1)
)
≥ −ε
follows and consequently
γnv
(
(p−n, 1)
)
− γnv
(
(p−n, 0)
)
≤
ε
1− pn
.
For p˜ = 0, with (10)
pn · γnv
(
(p−n, 1)
)
− pn · γnv
(
(p−n, 0)
)
≥ −ε
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follows and therefore
γnv
(
(p−n, 1)
)
− γnv
(
(p−n, 0)
)
≥ −
ε
pn
.
That implies
γnv
(
(p−n, 1)
)
− γnv
(
(p−n, 0)
)
∈
[
−
ε
pn
,
ε
1− pn
]
∈
[
−εξnp , εξ
n
p
]
(11)
where ξnp := max
(
1
1−pn ,
1
pn
)
.
Denote M(p) := {n ∈ N | pn ∈ (0, 1)} and
ξp :=


max
n∈M(p)
ξnp if M(p) 6= ∅
1 otherwise
.
With (8), (9) and (11)
∀n ∈ N :


γnv ((p
−n, 1)) − γnv ((p
−n, 0)) ≤ ε for pn = 0
γnv ((p
−n, 1)) − γnv ((p
−n, 0)) ∈ [−εξp, εξp] for p
n ∈ (0, 1)
γnv ((p
−n, 1)) − γnv ((p
−n, 0)) ≥ −ε for pn = 1
follows. With remark 2.11 and ξp ≥ 1, p is εξp-perfect in Γv.
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Remark 2.13 With (11) even
∀n ∈ N :


γnv ((p
−n, 1)) − γnv ((p
−n, 0)) ≤ ε for pn = 0
γnv ((p
−n, 1)) − γnv ((p
−n, 0)) ∈
[
− ε
pn
, ε1−pn
]
for pn ∈ (0, 1)
γnv ((p
−n, 1)) − γnv ((p
−n, 0)) ≥ −ε for pn = 1
holds.
Conclusion 2.14 Let Γv be a given one-step game.
p ∈ [0, 1]N is (0-)perfect for Γv ⇐⇒ p ∈ [0, 1]
N is a Nash-equilibrium in Γv
Conclusion 2.15 Let Γv be a given one-step game.
p ∈ {0, 1}N is ε-perfect for Γv ⇐⇒ p ∈ {0, 1}N is an ε-equilibrium in Γv
3 Equilibria in Quitting Games
This section presents an imported result referring to equilibria in quitting games. It was
proved by Solan and Vieille in [7], they showed that a cyclic ε-equilibrium (ε > 0) under some
assumptions on the payoff function exists.
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3.1 Preview
This section studies the influence of a variation in one component of the strategy profile
p ∈ [0, 1]N for a given quitting game Γv. Therefore define pˆ ∈ [0, 1]
N as follows
pˆ := pˆm,λ(p) :=
(
p−m, (1 − λ)pm + λ
)
, (12)
where p ∈ [0, 1]N , λ ∈ [0, 1] and m ∈ N .
That means, pˆm is a convex combination of pm and the pure strategy 1, which accords to the
action quit. For λ = 0 one obtains pˆ = p and for λ = 1 pˆ = (p−m, 1).
Theorem 3.1 Let Γv be a given one-step game, λ ∈ [0, 1], p ∈ [0, 1]
N and m ∈ N an
arbitrary but fixed chosen player. Then the following hold:
1. ̺(pˆ, ∅) = (1− λ)̺(p, ∅)
That means, the probability that all players play continue under pˆ is for the λ-fold
smaller of the continue-probability under p.
2. γv(pˆ) = (1− λ) · γv(p) + λ · γv
(
(p−m, 1)
)
3. ‖γv(pˆ)− γv(p)‖ ≤ λ · (rmax + δv)
where rmax := max{|r
n
S |
∣∣ n ∈ N , S ∈ P(S)} and δv = max{ max
n∈N
|vn|, rmax}
3
4. If p ∈ [0, 1]N is η-perfect in Γv (η ≥ 0) and if p
m ∈ (0, 1] for the given player m ∈ N
holds, then pˆ = pˆm,λ is η˜-perfect in Γv, with η˜ := max(2λrmax + (1− λ)η, η).
Proof:
To 1.: The definition of pˆ (c.f. (12) ) implies
̺(pˆ, ∅) =
∏
n∈N
(1− pˆn) =
(
1− (1− λ)pm − λ
)
·
∏
n∈N\{m}
(1− pn)
= (1− λ) ·
∏
n∈N
(1− pn)
= (1− λ) · ̺(p, ∅).
To 2.: With proposition 2.7 and the definition of pˆ
γv(pˆ) = pˆ
m · γv
(
(pˆ−m, 1)
)
+ (1− pˆm) · γv
(
(pˆ−m, 0)
)
=
(
(1− λ)pm + λ
)
· γv
(
(p−m, 1)
)
+ (1− λ)(1 − pm) · γv
(
(p−m, 0)
)
= (1− λ)
(
pm · γv
(
(p−m, 1)
)
+ (1− pm) · γv
(
(p−m, 0)
))
+ λ · γv
(
(p−m, 1)
)
= (1− λ) · γv(p) + λ · γv
(
(p−m, 1)
)
(13)
holds.
To 3.: Under use of (13) one obtains
3‖ · ‖ denotes the maximum norm, that means ‖y‖ := max
i∈N
|yi| for all y = (y1, . . . , yN)T ∈ RN .
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‖γv(pˆ)− γv(p)‖ =
∥∥(1− λ) · γv(p) + λ · γv((p−m, 1)) − γv(p)∥∥
=
∥∥λ · γv((p−m, 1)) − λγv(p)∥∥
= λ ·
∥∥γv((p−m, 1)) − γv(p)∥∥
≤ λ ·
(∥∥γv((p−m, 1))∥∥+ ∥∥γv(p)∥∥)
Because player m plays quit with certainty in the alternative strategy profile (p−m, 1)
γnv
(
(p−m, 1)
)
=
∑
S∈P(N )
̺
(
(p−m, 1), S
)
· rnS ∈ [−rmax, rmax]
follows for all n ∈ N with rmax = max{|r
n
S |
∣∣ n ∈ N , S ∈ P(S)}.
=⇒ ‖γv(pˆ)− γv(p)‖ ≤ λ ·
(
rmax + δv
)
where δv = max{ max
n∈N
|vn|, rmax}.
To 4.: For λ = 0 and as well as for pm = 1, pˆ = p follows and therefore pˆ is η-perfect in Γv
in that case.
For λ ∈ (0, 1] and pm ∈ (0, 1) it is to show, that
∀n ∈ N :


γnv ((pˆ
−n, 1)) − γnv ((pˆ
−n, 0)) ≤ η˜ for pˆ n = 0
γnv ((pˆ
−n, 1)) − γnv ((pˆ
−n, 0)) ∈ [−η˜, η˜] for pˆ n ∈ (0, 1)
γnv ((pˆ
−n, 1)) − γnv ((pˆ
−n, 0)) ≥ −η˜ for pˆ n = 1
(14)
holds with η˜ = max(2λrmax + (1 − λ)η, η).
Case 1: Consider player m. With p η-perfect and pm ∈ (0, 1)
γv
(
(pˆ−m, 1)
)
− γv
(
(pˆ−m, 0)
)
= γv
(
(p−m, 1)
)
− γv
(
(p−m, 0)
)
∈ [−η, η]
follows immediately and therefore the second inequality from (14) for pˆm ∈ (0, 1) respectively
the last inequality of (14) for pˆ = 1.
Case 2: Consider player n ∈ N \ {m}.
With the definition of pˆ for all i ∈ N and b ∈ [0, 1]
(pˆ−n, b)i =
{
(1− λ) · (p−n, b)i + λ for i = m
(p−n, b)i for i ∈ N \ {m}
follows. Under use of this and equation (13) one obtains
γnv
(
(pˆ−n, b)
)
= (1− λ) · γnv
(
(p−n, b)
)
+ λ · γnv
((
(p−n, b)−m, 1
))
.
This implies
γnv
(
(pˆ−n, 1)
)
− γnv
(
(pˆ−n, 0)
)
= (1− λ) · γnv
(
(p−n, 1)
)
+ λ · γnv
((
(p−n, 1)−m, 1
))
− (1− λ) · γnv
(
(p−n, 0)
)
− λ · γnv
((
(p−n, 0)−m, 1
))
= (1− λ) ·
(
γnv
(
(p−n, 1)
)
− γnv
(
(p−n, 0)
))
+ λ
(
γnv
((
(p−n, 1)−m, 1
))
− γnv
((
(p−n, 0)−m, 1
)))
. (15)
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(a) Consider player n ∈ N \ {m} with pn = 0.
pn = 0 ∧ p η-perfect =⇒ γnv
(
(p−n, 1)
)
− γnv
(
(p−n, 0)
)
≤ η (16)
With use of (15) and (16)
γnv
(
(pˆ−n, 1)
)
− γnv
(
(pˆ−n, 0)
)
≤ (1− λ) · η
+ λ ·
(
γnv
((
(p−n, 1)−m, 1
))
− γnv
((
(p−n, 0)−m, 1
)))
≤ (1− λ) · η
+ λ ·
(∣∣γnv (((p−n, 1)−m, 1))∣∣+ ∣∣γnv (((p−n, 0)−m, 1))∣∣)
≤ (1− λ) · η + λ (rmax + rmax)
= 2λrmax + (1− λ) · η
follows.
(b) Consider player n ∈ N \ {m} with pn ∈ (0, 1).
pn ∈ (0, 1) ∧ p η-perfect =⇒ γnv
(
(p−n, 1)
)
− γnv
(
(p−n, 0)
)
∈ [−η, η] (17)
With this analogously to case 2(a) it follows immediately that
γnv
(
(pˆ−n, 1)
)
− γnv
(
(pˆ−n, 0)
)
≤ 2λrmax + (1− λ) · η.
Under usage of (17) and equation (15) one obtains
γnv
(
(pˆ−n, 1)
)
− γnv
(
(pˆ−n, 0)
)
≥ −(1− λ) · η
− λ ·
(∣∣γnv (((p−n, 1)−m, 1))∣∣+ ∣∣γnv (((p−n, 0)−m, 1))∣∣)
≥ −2λrmax − (1− λ) · η (18)
and therefore
γnv
(
(pˆ−n, 1)
)
− γnv
(
(pˆ−n, 0)
)
∈
[
−
(
2λrmax + (1− λ) · η
)
, 2λrmax + (1− λ) · η
]
.
(c) Consider player n ∈ N \ {m} with pn = 1.
pn = 1 ∧ p η-perfect =⇒ γnv
(
(p−n, 1)
)
− γnv
(
(p−n, 0)
)
≥ −η (19)
With equation (19), (15) and inequality (18)
γnv
(
(pˆ−n, 1)
)
− γnv
(
(pˆ−n, 0)
)
≥ −(2λrmax + (1− λ) · η)
follows.

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Remark 3.2 (To theorem 3.1 3.)
1. Let Γv be a given one-step game with v ∈ [−2rmax, 2rmax], p ∈ [0, 1]
N , where pm ∈
(0, 1)N for at least one player m ∈ N , a strategy profile in Γv and λ ∈ (0, 1). Solan and
Vieille state in [7] the following estimation:
‖γv(pˆ)− γv(p)‖ ≤ 2λrmax, (20)
with pˆ and rmax like before.
Counter-example: Consider the following one-step game Γv with v =
(
1
2
)
.
Player 2
continue quit
Player 1
continue
quit
( 1 , 2)
( 1 ,−1 )
( 0 , 1 )
(−1 ,−0.5 )
=⇒ rmax = max{|r
n
S |
∣∣ n ∈ N , S ∈ P(N )} = 1 and max
n∈N
|vn| = 2
=⇒ δv = 2
Obviously p =
(
0
0
)
is one (and the only) equilibrium in Γv with the expected payoff
γv(p) = v.
Let λ = 0.1 be given. It holds that ̺(p, ∅) = 1 > 1 − λ = 0.9. Furthermore let pˆλ,1 be
defined like before, that means
pˆλ,1 = pˆ =
(
p1 + λ(1− p1)
p2
)
=
(
0 + 0.1 · 1
0
)
=
(
0.1
0
)
.
It holds that
γv(pˆ) = 0.9 ·
(
1
2
)
+ 0.1
(
1
−1
)
=
(
1
1.7
)
.
From this
‖γv(pˆ)−γv(p)‖ = ‖
(
1
1.7
)
−
(
1
2
)
‖ = 0.3 = λ(rmax+δv) > 2λrmax = 2·0.1·1 = 0.2
follows. So estimation (20) does not hold.
Furthermore the counter-example shows that the estimation in theorem 3.1 3. is even
the best estimation.
2. Interpretation: Let Γv be a given one-step game, λ ∈ [0, 1] and p ∈ [0, 1]
N with pm ∈
(0, 1) for at least one player m ∈ N . If the continue probability of one player m (m ∈ N )
is decreased by the λ-fold, then the expected payoff of the players changes maximal at
λ(rmax + δv) for a component.
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Remark 3.3 (To theorem 3.1 4.) Assuming that pm = 0 in theorem 3.1 4., pˆm = λ ∈
(0, 1) follows. In order to prove that pˆ is η˜-perfect it is to show that
γmv ((pˆ
−m, 1)) − γmv ((pˆ
−m, 0)) ∈ [−η˜, η˜]
But with p η-perfect only
γv
(
(pˆ−m, 1)
)
− γv
(
(pˆ−m, 0)
)
= γv
(
(p−m, 1)
)
− γv
(
(p−m, 0)
)
≤ η ≤ η˜
follows.
For the other direction holds
γv
(
(pˆ−m, 1)
)
− γv
(
(pˆ−m, 0)
)
= γv
(
(p−m, 1)
)
− γv
(
(p−m, 0)
)
≥ −
∣∣γv((p−m, 1))∣∣− ∣∣γv((p−m, 0))∣∣
≥ −rmax − δv,
however this holds for all p ∈ [0, 1]N in Γv.
But the proof that
∀n ∈ N \ {m} :


γnv ((pˆ
−n, 1)) − γnv ((pˆ
−n, 0)) ≤ η˜ for pˆ n = 0
γnv ((pˆ
−n, 1)) − γnv ((pˆ
−n, 0)) ∈ [−η˜, η˜] for pˆ n ∈ (0, 1)
γnv ((pˆ
−n, 1)) − γnv ((pˆ
−n, 0)) ≥ −η˜ for pˆ n = 1
will remain unaffected from this case.
Conclusion 3.4 With theorem 3.1 4. it follows immediately that if p ∈ [0, 1]N with pm ∈
(0, 1), for at least one m ∈ N , is (0−)perfect in Γv (and therefore an equilibrium in Γv), pˆ is
2λrmax-perfect in Γv.
The following example shows, that the estimation in theorem 3.1 4. is even the best approx-
imation.
Example 4: Consider the following one-step game Γv with v = (
9
10 ,
10
9 )
T ∈ R2 given by
Player 2
continue quit
Player 1
continue
quit
(
9/10, 10/9
)(
1, −1
) ( 1/2, 1 )(
−1, 1
)
=⇒ rmax = 1
Let p =
(
0.1
0
)
be the given strategy profile in Γv. It holds
γ1v
(
(p−1, 1)
)
− γ1v
(
(p−1, 0)
)
= 1− v1 = 1−
9
10
= 0.1 ∈ [−0.1, 0.1] and
γ2v
(
(p−2, 1)
)
− γ2v
(
(p−2, 0)
)
= 0.1 · 1 + 0.9 · 1− 0.1 · (−1)− 0.9 ·
10
9
= 0.1 ≤ 0.1.
Therefore p is η-perfect in Γv with η = 0.1.
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Let λ = 0.2 be given.
=⇒ pˆλ,1 = pˆ =
(
(1− λ) · p1 + λ
p2
)
=
(
0.8 · 0.1 + 0.2
0
)
=
(
0.28
0
)
For pˆ the following hold
γ1v
(
(pˆ−1, 1)
)
− γ1v
(
(pˆ−1, 0)
)
= 1−
9
10
= 0.1 ∈ [−0.1, 0.1] and
γ2v
(
(pˆ−2, 1)
)
− γ2v
(
(pˆ−2, 0)
)
= 0.28 · 1 + 0.72 · 1− 0.28 · (−1)− 0.72 ·
10
9
= 0.48
= (1− λ)η + 2λrmax = 0.8 · 0.1 + 2 · 0.2 · 1 = 0.48.
So pˆ is only 0.48-perfect in Γv and the estimation in theorem 3.1 4. holds.
3.2 Equilibria under some assumptions on the payoff function
This section shows which importance one-step games have, referring to the detection of equi-
libria in quitting games.
Firstly an important theorem from Solan and Vieille, stated in [7] is quoted. The proof of this
theorem is divided into three parts, represented by the propositions 3.6, 3.8 and 3.9. Secondly
the proposition 3.6 is proved at length by using the now known results about one-step games
and their strategy profiles.
Theorem 3.5 Let be ε > 0. Every quitting game G that satisfies the following has a cyclic
subgame ε-equilibrium.
1. rn{n} = 1 for every n ∈ N ;
2. rnS ≤ 1 for every n ∈ N and every S such that n ∈ S.
Before quoting the above mentioned propositions another notation is needed.
Let V˜ be a subset of RN and ε ∈ (0, 1) be given. ψε denotes a correspondence
4 from V˜ into
V˜ , where
ψε(v) := ψε,V˜ (v) :=
{
γv(p)
∣∣ γv(p) ∈ V˜ , p ∈ [0, 1]N , p 2εrmax-perfect, ̺(p, ∅) ≤ 1− ε}.
Proposition 3.6 Let ε ∈ (0, 1) be given. Define
V :=
{
v˜ ∈ [−2rmax, 2rmax]
N
∣∣ ∃n ∈ N : v˜n ≤ 1}.
Assume that
1. rn{n} = 1 for every n ∈ N
2. for every v ∈ V an equilibrium p in Γv exists, such that either
(a) p = (0, 0, . . . , 0)T (that means all players choose continue) or
4 Let K and L be sets. A correspondence J : K ։ L is a subset J of K × L and one defines for all k ∈ K:
J(k) := {l|(k, l) ∈ J}. It is not assumed a priori that J(k) 6= ∅ for all or any particular k ∈ K.
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(b) p 6= (0, 0, . . . , 0)T and γnv (p) ≤ 1 hold for some n ∈ N with p
n > 0.
Then ψε(v) 6= ∅ for all v ∈ V .
Remark 3.7 1. Let G be a quitting game, which satisfies the assumptions of theorem
3.5, and Γv a corresponding one-step game to G with v ∈ V . Then a strategy profile
p ∈ [0, 1]N exists, which satisfies the assumption 2 of proposition 3.6.
Proof: That every one-step game has got an equilibrium was shown in [2]. The
proof uses Kakutani’s fixed point theorem. Furthermore either p = (0, . . . , 0)T or
p 6= (0, . . . , 0)T holds. For the second case it is to show, that there a player m with
pm > 0 and γmv (p) ≤ 1 exists. Because of p 6= (0, . . . , 0)
T at least one player m ∈ N
exists with pm > 0.
Consider the case that pm = 1. Then with the assumption 2 of theorem 3.5
γmv (p) =
∑
S∈P(N )
̺(p, S)rmS
=
∑
∅6=S⊆N\{m}
̺(p, S ∪ {m})rmS∪{m}
≤
∑
∅6=S⊆N\{m}
̺(p, S ∪ {m}) · 1
≤ 1
follows.
Consider the case pm ∈ (0, 1). Because p is an equilibrium in Γv, p is also (0-)perfect in
Γv. This implies γ
m
v (p
−m, 1)− γmv (p
−m, 0) = 0. Analogously to the case above it follows
that γmv (p
−m, 1) ≤ 1 and with use of the linearity of γv(p) in p
m one obtains
γmv (p) = γ
m
v (p
−m, 1) ≤ 1. (21)

2. The assumptions of proposition 3.6 are basically there to allow the in remark 3.3 men-
tioned estimation below for p = (0, . . . , 0) respectively to ensure that pm ∈ (0, 1] in the
case p 6= (0, . . . , 0)T .
Proposition 3.8 Let ε ∈ (0, 1) be given. If a compact set V exists such that ψε(v) 6= ∅ for
all v ∈ V , then a cyclic profile π = (pi)i∈N in G exists, such that for every i ∈ N:
1. πi = (pj)i≤j∈N is terminating
5 and
2. pi is (2rmax + 2)ε-perfect in γγ(pii+1).
5 Let G = (N , (rS)∅⊆S⊆N ) be a given quitting game and pi ∈ Π the chosen strategy profile. If Ppi(τ <
+∞) = 1 the game G is called terminating.
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Proposition 3.9 Let π = (pi)i∈N be a strategy profile in G. Assume that the following
properties hold for every i ∈ N:
1. πi = (pj)i≤j∈N is terminating and
2. pi is ε-perfect in γγ(pii+1).
Then either π is a subgame ε
1
6 -equilibrium, or there is a stationary ε
1
6 -equilibrium.
3.2.1 Proof of Proposition 3.6
Proof: Let v ∈ V and ε ∈ (0, 1) be arbitrary but fix. The aim is to construct a pˆ ∈ [0, 1]N
with γv(pˆ) ∈ ψε(v).
It holds that ψε(v) 6= ∅, if a strategy profile p ∈ [0, 1]
N in Γv exists, such that
(i) γv(p) ∈ V =
{
v˜ ∈ [−2rmax, 2rmax]
N
∣∣ ∃n ∈ N : v˜n ≤ 1}
(ii) p is 2εrmax-perfect in Γv
(iii) ̺(p, ∅) ≤ 1− ε.
Now let p be an equilibrium in Γv that satisfies the assumptions of the proposition
6.
To (i): If p = (0, . . . , 0)T , then γv(p) = v ∈ V holds. In the other case (p 6= (0, . . . , 0)
T )
the proposition postulated that a player m ∈ N exists such that γmv (p) ≤ 1. Furthermore
with the definition of V , proposition 2.5 and
δv = max
{
max
n∈N
|vn|, rmax
}
≤ max
{
max
v∈V,n∈N
|vn|, rmax
}
= 2rmax
γv(p) ∈ [−2rmax, 2rmax]
N holds. That implies γv(p) ∈ V .
To (ii): Conclusion 2.14 implies that p is even 0-perfect in Γv.
To (iii): For p = (0, . . . , 0)T , ̺(p, ∅) = 1  1− ε holds and for p 6= (0, . . . , 0)T , ̺(p, ∅) < 1
but not necessarily ̺(p, ∅) ≤ 1− ε.
So γv(p) is not necessarily an element of ψε(v).
Based on the given strategy profile p, a new profile pˆ ∈ [0, 1]N like in section 3.1 for the
one-step game Γv will be constructed such that ̺(pˆ, ∅) ≤ 1 − ε holds. Afterwards it will be
shown that this profile pˆ satisfies the conditions (i) and (ii), stated at the beginning of this
proof, as well.
First to the construction of pˆ: Fix a player m with vm = 1 if p = (0, . . . , 0)T or with pm > 0
and γmv (p) ≤ 1 otherwise
7 and set pˆ like in (12), that means
pˆ n =
{
(1− ε) · pn + ε for n = m
pn for n 6= m
.
6Such a probability p ∈ [0, 1] exists, c.f. remark 3.7.
7Let p = (0, . . . , 0)T be the given equilibrium in Γv. Since v ∈ V , a player m ∈ N with v
m ≤ 1 exists.
Because p is an equilibrium in Γv, v
m = 1 follows. Assume that vm < 1, then player m could change for the
better, if he chooses to play quit with certainty, hence rm{m} = 1 (c.f. assumption 1. of proposition 3.6). This
is a contradiction to p is an equilibrium.
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Theorem 3.1 1. implies
̺(pˆ, ∅) = (1− ε) · ̺(p, ∅) ≤ 1− ε.
To (i): It will be shown that γv(pˆ) ∈ V =
{
v˜ ∈ [−2rmax, 2rmax]
N
∣∣ ∃n ∈ N : v˜n ≤ 1}.
With proposition 2.5 and δv ≤ 2rmax, γv(pˆ) ∈ [−2rmax, 2rmax]
N follows. Consider the chosen
player m ∈ N . Because p is an equilibrium in Γv
γmv (p) ≥ γ
m
v
(
(p−m, pˆm)
)
= γmv (pˆ)
holds and with the special choice of player m
1 ≥ γmv (p) ≥ γ
m
v (pˆ) (22)
follows. So γv(pˆ) ∈ V .
To (ii): It is to show that pˆ is 2εrmax-perfect in Γv.
Case 1: pm ∈ (0, 1]
With theorem 3.1 4. and p (0−)perfect in Γv it follows immediately, that pˆ is 2εrmax-perfect
in Γv.
Case 2: pm = 0
(a) Consider player m. Because p is an equilibrium in Γv, p is also (0-)perfect in Γv. With
this and pm = 0
γmv
(
(pˆ−m, 1)
)
− γmv
(
(pˆ−m, 0)
)
= γmv
(
(p−m, 1)
)
− γmv
(
(p−m, 0)
)
= rm{m} − v
m
= 1− 1 = 0 ∈ [−0,+0]
follows.
(b) Consider player n ∈ N . With theorem 3.1 4. and remark 3.3
∀n ∈ N \ {m} :


γnv ((pˆ
−n, 1)) − γnv ((pˆ
−n, 0)) ≤ 2εrmax for pˆ
n = 0
γnv ((pˆ
−n, 1)) − γnv ((pˆ
−n, 0)) ∈ [−2εrmax, 2εrmax] for pˆ
n ∈ (0, 1)
γnv ((pˆ
−n, 1)) − γnv ((pˆ
−n, 0)) ≥ −2εrmax for pˆ
n = 1
holds.
Together with Case 2(a) follows that pˆ with pm = 0 is 2εrmax-perfect in the one-step game
Γv.
So pˆ ∈ ψε(v) 6= ∅ for all v ∈ V .

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